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Car Trouble
Douglas G. Baird

Abstract
By common account, the reorganizations of Chrysler and General Motors
were extraordinary cases, very much alike, but different from any other.
Government intervention on such a scale is not likely to recur and, given
their peculiar character, these bankruptcies offer few lessons for corporate
reorganizations as a general matter. This essay suggests that this perception
is fundamentally wrong.
Each case presented a radically different challenge for the bankruptcy
system. Moreover, these two distinct challenges, far from being unusual,
are not particularly related to the fact of government involvement and are
likely to recur many times.
The debate over speedy sales of businesses in Chapter 11 is over. Sales
are now the norm in large reorganizations. Instead of asking whether there
should be sales in bankruptcy, we need to ask how to police various forms
of abuse. The principal types of abuse derive from where the controlling
creditor lies in the capital structure.
In both Chrysler and General Motors, the government was simply a large
creditor exercising control over its debtor and pushing for a speedy sale of
the assets. But because the government occupied different places in the capital structures in the two cases, the legal challenges were altogether different. Together they capture the issues central to large Chapter 11 cases today.
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Car Trouble
Douglas G. Baird
At the start of 2009, General Motors and Chrysler were bleeding to
death.1 Maintaining either business as a going concern required a massive infusion of capital—tens of billions of dollars—no one in the private
market was willing to provide. Many have focused on the decision of
first the Bush and then the Obama administration to keep these businesses alive.2 Rather than join this debate, this paper focuses on the use
of the bankruptcy process to effect the bailout and in particular on what
it tells us about corporate reorganizations going forward.3
In December 2009, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s
decision in Chrysler.4 As the Court was not compelled to take this step,
one might draw from it the suggestion that the Supreme Court meant to
signal that Chrysler—and General Motors—are extraordinary cases, very
much alike, but different from any other. They would have been bankruptcy’s Bush v. Gore if they reached the Supreme Court on the merits,
but they did not. From the perspective of bankruptcy law, they are nonevents. Government intervention on such a scale is not likely to recur
and, given their peculiar character, these bankruptcies raise few issues
of moment for corporate reorganizations as a general matter.
General Motors, by its own excessively optimistic predictions, was going to burn
through $18 billion in cash within a year. See General Motors Corporation, 2009–2014
Restructuring Plan Presented to U.S. Department of the Treasury As Required Under Section
7.20 of the Loan and Security Agreement Between General Motors and the U. S. Department of
the Treasury Dated December 31, 2008, Table 12, at 30 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AIFP/GMRestructuringPlan.pdf.
Chrysler
losses were considerable, but less spectacular. It was a smaller firm and was therefore
losing less. In addition, as it was about to shut down production for a number of months
due to a massive inventory of unsold cars, Chrysler had less immediate cash needs. See
Chrysler, Chrysler Restructuring Plan for Long-Term Viability, at 39 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AIFP/chryslerRestCoverSum.pdf.
2 For an insider’s defense, see STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT
OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2010). For
an overview that places the rescue in the context of the automobile industry as a whole,
see PAUL INGRASSIA, CRASH COURSE: THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY’S ROAD TO
BANKRUPTCY AND BAILOUT—AND BEYOND (2010).
3 One can raise, of course, a broad objection to the government’s use of the bankruptcy process in both Chrysler and General Motors. The bankruptcy process allowed
the federal government to funnel billions to workers, tort victims, and retirees that it
could not have given them directly. The bankruptcy process, so this argument goes,
provided a conduit, a means of laundering funds, to a politically powerful constituency
that it could not otherwise have paid off. Jim White has been the strongest proponent of
this view. I do not engage in this debate either.
4 See Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
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This perception is fundamentally wrong. First, the cases are not at
all alike. Each case presented a radically different challenge for the
bankruptcy system. Moreover, these two distinct challenges, far from
being unusual, are not particularly related to the fact of government involvement and are likely to recur many times. Together they capture a
tension central to large Chapter 11 cases today.
The bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors, quite apart from
debates about government intervention in the marketplace, underscore
the need to recognize a fundamental shift in large reorganization practice over the last fifteen years. The debate over speedy sales of all the
assets of the business as a going concern is over.5 Sales are the norm in
large reorganizations that are anything other than a confirmation of a
debt restructuring reached outside of bankruptcy. The debate now centers on how the sales should be conducted.
Instead of asking whether there should be auctions in bankruptcy,
we need to ask how to run them. At the time of the bankruptcies, the
government was already a large investor in both Chrysler and General
Motors. As far as the bankruptcy process itself was concerned, the government was, to a very large extent, simply a large creditor exercising
control over its debtor. Bankruptcy law tries to ensure that those who
have such control do not abuse it. The types of potential abuse derive in
the first instance from where the controlling creditor is in the capital
structure. In Chrysler, the government held a junior stake, while in General Motors it held a senior one. These are the two principal problems we
face in designing an effective sales process: Ensuring that, when junior
investors control the sale, they do not put seniors at risk and ensuring
that, when seniors control, juniors are protected.
I. Chrysler
The precipitating event for the bankruptcies of both Chrysler and
General Motors was a credit crisis that depressed consumer demand for
automobiles. Fifteen million cars and light trucks had been sold in
North America every year since 1994, but in the last part of 2008, the
annual rate dropped over the course of a few weeks to less than ten million a year, a level not seen since the 1960s.6 And it quickly became clear
that the rate would not return to its previous rate for years. A drop of
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 673 (2003).
6 Chrysler Restructuring Plan, supra note 1. at 34 (“decline in SAAR levels in 2008 has
been at an unprecedented pace–dropping 5.8 million units from 15.6 million in January
2008 to a 9.8 million monthly annualized rate in January 2009”).
5
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this magnitude had never happened before, not even during the 1930s,
and it had never happened so suddenly. As my discussion of General
Motors’s bankruptcy will make plain, this collapse in demand was not
the whole story, but by itself it was enough to seal Chrysler’s fate.
Even with a rise in demand of several million cars and trucks per
year, Chrysler had no future as a going concern. By the most optimistic
accounts, there was massive overcapacity in the domestic automobile
industry.7 Some of that capacity had to go off-line. In a market economy,
the capacity that should go offline is the least efficient and the least valuable and this was Chrysler. Chrysler was making the worst cars, and
there was no prospect that this would change. In sharp contrast to
Chrysler’s previous reorganization in 1980, where Lee Iaccoca’s Chrysler had the K-car and the minivan in the wings, Chrysler had nothing
waiting and the cars were not a type people wanted.8 Without cars that
could compete on equal terms, Chrysler could not survive. At the time
that the Bush administration decided to extend credit to Chrysler, a few
might have thought otherwise. By the time the Obama administration
took power, no one did.
The question for the Obama administration was not whether to
shut Chrysler down, but how to do it. It considered two alternatives.
One was to close Chrysler immediately. The other was to allow Chrysler
to fail slowly over the course of several years in a way that coincided
with Fiat’s entry into the U.S. market. With luck, Fiat could make its cars
at factories that had been producing Chryslers while taking advantage
of part of Chrysler’s existing distribution system. A few of Chrysler’s
old workers might be able to keep their jobs. The Jeep brand name could
continue, though likely not the manufacturing operations that were
making Jeeps. Some other Chrysler brands might also survive.
The Obama administration ultimately opted for the second option,
even though it required several billion dollars and came with no guarantee of success—success being defined as Chrysler slowly morphing
into Fiat without many noticing. Success, so defined, depends first on
whether the automobile market recovers quickly enough. It also depends on whether Fiat culture and technology can marry well with old
Chrysler’s culture and technology. Fiat’s ambitious plans also assume

J.D. Power and Associates estimated North American utilization at 50% of capacity in 2009. See Liam Denning, Detroit Risks Falling Back Into Temptation, Wall St. J., Nov.
25, 2009, at C16
8 See Denning, supra note 7. (Chrysler to replace only 8.3% of its fleet each year between 2010 and 2013 compared with 11% at GM and 25% at Ford).
7
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that the market share of existing Chrysler cars will increase.9 Some in
the administration who thought the gamble, however bad, was worth
taking, and they were able, after some effort, to persuade the President
to take it.10
As Chrysler had no value as a going concern, Fiat was not willing
to pay a positive price for it. Before Fiat would agree to run it in exchange for a large equity interest, the federal government had to inject
billions of dollars into the business and also buy peace with the labor
unions and other constituencies. Moreover, Chrysler needed to rid the
business of its existing liabilities as well as dramatically alter its dealer
network.
Bankruptcy seemed a useful way to bring about all of this. After
cutting a deal with the unions, the Auto Task Force arranged for Chrysler to file a bankruptcy petition.11 At the same time, it injected cash from
TARP into a new subsidiary of Fiat called New CarCo. Fiat put in no
cash of its own. New CarCo appeared on the first day of the case with a
$2 billion bid to buy the assets of Chrysler free and clear of any existing
claims, including secured claims, as well as any obligations to the old
dealers. As long as the judge approved the sale procedures and no competing buyer appeared, New CarCo would become the owner of those
Chrysler assets that were useful to Fiat.
Finding a buyer before the bankruptcy to assimilate the assets of a
distressed business into its own is a familiar theme of large reorganizations. The challenge for the court in such cases in one of ensuring that
the sales process is one that respects the rights of those who are not in
control of the debtor and who object to the sale. And, of course, there
were quite a number who objected. This sale left tort victims who suffered injuries before the bankruptcy petition out in the cold. Dealers
who were no longer wanted were abandoned. The secured bondholders
were paid only thirty cents on the dollar. Each of these parties appeared
and objected. Were any of their rights violated? Did anyone get paid
Chrysler expects its market share to rise from 9.5% to 13.5% between now and
2013. See Denning, supra note 7.
10 The Task Force recommended the second liquidation option to Obama, although
without great enthusiasm. One of the dissenters, Austan Goolsby, now the chair of the
Council of Economic Advisors, continued to press for immediate liquidation. Obama
postponed his decision on Chrysler and insisted on a special evening meeting where the
question could be debated at length. Only after that meeting did he opt for the slowliquidation option. See Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We Did It, FORTUNE (October 21, 2009).
11 The components of the reorganization plan are summarized in In re Chrysler
LLC, 405 Bankr. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9
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who should not have been? Was there anyone who did not get paid who
should have been?
The question with respect to the existing tort victims is easy as matter of existing law. Tort claims are ordinary general claims that take a
back seat to those of secured creditors and no one seriously argued that
Chrysler was worth more than its secured creditors were owed. If there
is not enough to pay the secured creditors, the tort victims are not entitled to anything.
It is easy to argue that the law should be otherwise. Tort law should
hold firms liable only for acts that impose unreasonable costs on others,
but as long as this happens a superpriority lien would neither limit desirable investment nor make reorganization more difficult. Indeed,
faced with the risk of being primed by tort victims, investors will ensure
that firms take sensible precautions. And there is no unfairness to them,
as they can adjust the terms of their investments to take account of potential tort liability. Of course, if tort liability were not sensibly defined,
it might deter behavior on the part of firms that is socially desirable, but
this is a consequence of a bad tort law, not of superpriority. The obligation to pay tort victims would affect only the distribution of the firm’s
assets.
If changes were required in the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate
superpriority tort liens, they would be modest. While the costs of adjudicating tort liability may be substantial, these costs exist outside of
bankruptcy, as well as inside. In the extreme case, superpriority tort
liens may themselves exceed the value of the firm, but this means only
that the costs of administering the bankruptcy will be borne by the tort
victims. The process can be administered even in these circumstances.
More to the point for purposes of this paper, there is nothing about the
priority accorded tort victims that is peculiar to the government’s involvement in the case.
The automobile dealers who were abandoned argued that Chrysler
should not be able to extinguish automobile franchises in bankruptcy.
They asserted that the decision to terminate their dealerships made no
economic sense. Car manufacturers do not subsidize them. If they are
losing money from running their dealerships poorly, it is their money
that is being lost. This argument, however, is both orthogonal to the legal argument and wrong on the merits.
Every manufacturer needs a way of bringing its product to market.
For some, the strategy involves finding independent retailers. For some,
there is complete vertical integration. For others, it is a mixture of the
two. The optimal distribution mechanism may change. Microsoft, for
example, is now creating its own retail outlets. Regardless of the organi-
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zational structure, a manufacturer needs to have sales outlets in the
right-sized facilities, run by the right people, located in the right places.
Courts are poorly positioned to second-guess these decisions.
Moreover, it is easy to see that Chrysler’s dealer network was part
of its problem. It was put in place in a different era. In 2009, it was completely out of step with what Fiat needed. Even if it could free itself of
deeply embedded norms, state and federal franchise laws made it hard
to restructure the distribution channel. Once established, dealers can be
terminated only for cause. Radically different channels for selling cars—
such as through the Internet without any dealer intermediation—are not
possible. Locking an industry into a hopelessly inefficient method of
distribution in the age of Walmart makes little sense. Car manufacturers
should be able to experiment with different ways of selling their goods
just like computer makers.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a debtor should, in the exercise
of its business judgment, be able to use bankruptcy to bring about these
kinds of changes. By the usual account, dealerships are executory contracts that can be rejected, and the judge in Chrysler accepted this conventional wisdom. The dealers might have been able to press their case
more forcefully than they did. There is good reason to think this conventional wisdom wrong. Chrysler’s complaint is essentially with nonbankruptcy legal protections that automobile dealers enjoy. It is far from
clear that bankruptcy law should be in the business of second-guessing
these rules, rules that may have the effect of giving automobile dealers
something akin to a property right. Chrysler had not only promised to
keep delivering cars at a specified price, but also conveyed the right to
use the Chrysler name/brand in a particular geographic area. The franchise is a form of property. Once property is sold, it cannot be recovered
in bankruptcy by virtue of the ability to reject executory contracts. The
power to reject an executory contract is not an avoiding power.12
Whether the franchises were purely contractual or contractual
coupled with the conveyance of a property interest itself requires closer
examination than any of the parties gave it. This question illustrates a
long-standing tension in bankruptcy law and the way that the treatment
of executory contracts is, as a general matter, one of the worst flaws in
the Bankruptcy Code. But the judge here broke no new ground in allowing these dealerships to be terminated.

12 See Michael Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,”
59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1988).
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It might seem that the way that secured creditors were treated was
what was most seriously wrong in Chrysler and that their treatment was
a direct consequence of government intervention. Secured creditors are
supposed to be paid in full before those junior to them get paid anything. This is bankruptcy’s absolute priority rule. Put in place first in the
1930s, it has become one of bankruptcy’s central axioms.13 But it is not at
all clear that the absolute priority rule was violated.
In the first instance, the secured creditor’s right to absolute priority,
like any other right, is one that can be waived in the bankruptcy process
itself. This seems to have happened here. Secured creditors in Chrysler,
as a group, consented to the Task Force Plan. As in most large financings, the secured creditor in Chrysler was not a single financial institution, but rather a consortium of lenders who had joined forces. The loan
agreement set out how they would coordinate their efforts. It explicitly
provided that the administrative agent was to follow the wishes of the
majority in deciding whether to block the sale of the collateral.14 Over
ninety percent of the consortium in Chrysler agreed to accept the government’s offer of $2 billion. They told the administrative agent not to
block the sale, and he followed their instructions.
Those who opposed the sale were outvoted. They needed to explain
why the loan agreement did not bind them. They invoked a provision in
another part of the loan agreement that prevented “waivers, amendments, supplements or modifications” to the loan agreement without
their consent. This was not a strong argument on the merits, and the
judge likely interpreted the loan agreement correctly. But whether he
did or not, is quite beside the point. Interpreting such agreements
among creditors in the same class is a job the bankruptcy judge routinely faces in large cases. It has nothing to do with government involvement in the case.
The dissident secured creditors argued further that the vote of the
majority was tainted. The majority of investors that approved the sale
had received TARP funds. They were not consenting in order to maximize the value of their secured claim, but rather because they feared re-

13 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). It is sometimes asserted that the absolute priority rule has deeper roots. This is wrong. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT.
REV. 393, 416-17.
14 See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 Bankr. 84, 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). As I discuss below, secured creditors control whether a sale takes place to a third party by the device of
credit-bidding. Ensuring that this right exists, not an issue in Chrysler, is an important
element of protecting secured creditors when those junior to them are in control.
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percussions elsewhere if they refused to do the government’s bidding. It
is hard to have much sympathy for this argument. First, the minority
investors were not babes in the woods. They should never have thought
that J.P. Morgan was going to do anything other than follow its own
self-interest if the deal went sour. While these particular circumstances
were not foreseeable, the dissenting creditors could anticipate that there
were any number of ways in which J.P. Morgan’s interests might diverge from their own. This is a class of risk for which sophisticated investors are compensated. We might have a legal rule that required controlling creditors to look out for the interests of the minority, but we do
not. While controlling shareholders in a solvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, there is no corresponding duty in
the case of creditors.
I have argued elsewhere that allocating fiduciary duties in this fashion is unsound.15 But there is no issue of unfairness. It should not
have come as a surprise to any investor in this deal that J.P. Morgan
would be looking after its own interests in deciding whether the assets
were sold. It was incumbent on the dissenters to bargain for a different
contract if they wanted one. And even if J.P. Morgan and the other
lenders broke their obligations under the loan agreement in their instructions to the administrative agent, the remedy would seem to be a
state-court contract action.
The duties investors in the same slice of the capital structure owe
each other are contractual. The problem that investors face in coordinating their actions with one another does not implicate bankruptcy
process beyond making it important that bankruptcy judges enforce
contracts as written, something they are generally inclined to do.16 A
modern bankruptcy judge is not likely to be biased against one or the
other in assessing a battle between investors at the same priority level.
Even if the secured creditors as a group had not consented, it is still
not obvious that anything is amiss. To be sure, New CarCo was planning to make payments to retiree pension funds and various suppliers.
Indeed, it later even assumed Chrysler’s tort liabilities. But New CarCo
was never in bankruptcy. Chrysler, the debtor that filed the bankruptcy
petition, gave everything it had to the secured creditors. It did not pay
its general creditors anything. It sold its assets to New CarCo for $2 billion in cash. The absolute priority rule required that all of this cash go to
the secured creditors and it did. Why should Chrysler’s secured credi15 See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1309 (2008).
16 See, e.g., In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 Bankr. 671, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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tors be able to complain that New CarCo, a completely different entity,
is giving money to some who had once been creditors of Chrysler?
I owe you a bunch of money, and you have a security interest in
everything I own. My only asset is a Van Gogh. I file for bankruptcy and
the trustee puts my painting up for sale. And there are two bidders. One
bids $1 million. He is going to put the Van Gogh above his sofa. The
other bids $2 million. He is a loving son who plans to give it to his
mother so she can put it above her sofa. Confronted with these two bids,
it would seem that my bankruptcy trustee should take the $2 million
bid. It is completely irrelevant that the mother is also a general creditor
in my bankruptcy. She is receiving the asset because her son was the
high bidder, not because she was my general creditor. Creditors of a seller should not care how the buyer will use the assets, nor how sentimental, generous, or stupid he is.
New CarCo offered to pay more for Chrysler’s assets than anyone
else. The secured creditors should count their good fortune. Chrysler
had no value as a going concern.17 Far from receiving less than the business was worth, the secured creditors were receiving more. You have to
expect that someone who is paying you too much will bestow largess on
others as well. Usually when you find a buyer who offers you more than
he should, you do not complain that he is being unnecessarily generous
to others. You take the money before he recognizes his idiocy.
Of course, one can argue that the willingness of the government to
invest billions of dollars in a business that had no value as a going concern has the effect, over the long-term, of distorting investment decisions. But the distortion here arises from giving the secured creditors
too much, not too little. It makes them too inclined to invest in declining
industries. The complaint that the government intervention discourages
investors in a particular industry gets things backwards.
The principal obligation New CarCo assumed was the support of
Chrysler’s retiree benefits. There is a second way to justify these. The
retirees may have been paid not because the government wanted to bestow largess on them nor because they were prepetition creditors, but
because the UAW had the ability to shut the firm down postpetition.
Unlike some other unions, the UAW protects its retirees, and it might
not have been possible to run Chrysler as a going concern without cutting a deal that included the retirees. In theory, Chrysler could reject the

17 Chrysler may, however, have had a positive value if it were liquidated. I return
to this issue below.
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collective bargaining agreement and the retiree benefits in bankruptcy.18
It could then hire replacement workers willing to cross picket lines. But
it is hard to see how Chrysler could have survived such a shock.
Let us assume that Chrysler would be worth $5 billion in a world
without the UAW, but the UAW can credibly threaten to shut it down
unless $3 billion is paid to the retiree benefit fund. How much is Chrysler worth as a going concern? In the counterfactual Twilight Zone world
in which the UAW does not exist, the firm is worth $5 billion, but on
Planet Earth, it is worth only $2 billion. The need to pay the retirees $3
billion is a cost of doing business—no different from the money needed
to pay what might seem high prices for zoning variances, concrete, or
garbage collection.19 Every buyer takes these into account in making a
bid. A rational buyer pays $3 billion to retirees not on account of the
prepetition debt owed them, but because of what it receives from them
postpetition. The debtor’s senior creditors cannot complain that others
are being paid for something (labor peace) that they neither own nor
control. The deal the government cut with the UAW might have been
the deal cut by anyone committed to keeping the business running. In
this sense, the government was not behaving any differently from a private creditor trying to maximize its return on a bad investment.
The secured creditors as a group, however, would have grounds for
complaint if Chrysler were more than $2 billion if liquidated. The government demanded that Chrysler shop the company extensively before
settling on Fiat, but less clear is how much it required Chrysler to explore a piecemeal sale of the assets. The rule of thumb when you liquidate a company is that you realize ten percent of book value. That might
not seem like much, but in the case of Chrysler, it was more than twice
New CarCo’s bid. Creditors should not much care who the buyer happens to be or what plans the buyer has for the assets, but they should
care about ensuring that the sale brings top dollar. They should be able
to object to a sale of the business as a going concern if more could have
been realized by selling it off in pieces.
Chrysler owned a lot of real estate. It had a valuable trademark in
Jeep. Its transmission business was well respected. There were accounts
receivable in the billions of dollars. To be sure, the value of these assets
had to be discounted. Real estate values had plummeted and land used
Sections 1113 and 1114, however, may the process of rejecting these contracts
harder than it is for ordinary contracts.
19 There is nothing new here. Dangerfield makes the same point. See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlVDGmjz7eM&feature=related (noting the need
to account for such expenses as costs of business much like any other).
18
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for manufacturing can be a toxic waste site that has a negative value. A
Chinese company might not be willing to pay much for the Jeep brand
name if it feared that a hostile Congress might not allow the cars to be
exported to the United States. Many accounts would prove uncollectable if Chrysler shut down as Chrysler’s liquidation would likely trigger
a liquidation of the account debtors. A promise from a Chrysler dealer is
likely worth even less than Chrysler’s own promise. Nevertheless, a piecemeal sale of assets would likely fetch something. Hence, the question
was not whether New CarCo was paying a fair price for Chrysler as a
going concern. As a going concern, any positive price would be fair. The
proper question rather is whether the amount bid exceeded the value of
Chrysler if broken up piecemeal.
Chrysler did pay a valuation expert who, in return for a fee of $10
million, said that, if liquidated, Chrysler would be unlikely to yield
more than $2 billion after the costs of the sale were taken into account.
But the amount someone would pay to acquire Chrysler’s assets with
the intent to liquidate them is not a question that should be left to expert
testimony. It should be tested by the market.
In short, the key question in Chrysler is not whether there should
have been a free-and-clear sale, but rather whether enough was done to
get the best price.20 The government had Chrysler propose bidding procedures that defined as a “qualified bid” only those that assumed the
obligations that New CarCo was planning to assume. Many of these,
such as promises to retirees, made sense if the business was continuing
as a going concern, but not otherwise. The debtor could consider nonqualified bids in the exercise of its fiduciary duty only after consultation
with both the U.S. Treasury and the UAW. This falls somewhat short of
affirmatively welcoming liquidating bids. The failure of the bankruptcy
judge to open the bidding process more contrasts sharply with practice
elsewhere. For example, the judge in the Sun Times bankruptcy insisted
(over objection) that liquidating bids be entertained. He did not expect
any and none appeared, but he wanted to cut square corners.
Chrysler is emblematic of a larger class of cases in which the junior
creditors are in control and one needs to ensure that the sale procedures
protect the senior creditors. This may not be that hard. In theory, it is

20 Barry Adler, Mark Roe, and David Skeel have made this point. See Barry E. Adler, Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization after Chrysler and General Motors, A Chapter
11 at the Crossroads: Does Reorganization Need Reform?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305
(2010); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV.
727 (2010).
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not possible to sell a company over the objection of a senior creditor for
less than the amount of its claim.
Let us assume that the secured creditor is owed $10. The debtor has
found a stalking horse bidder who is offering $2. At this point, the secured creditor can simply go to a bank, obtain a $10 credit line, and
make a $10 bid. If it proves the high bidder, the secured creditor, as the
high bidder, draws on the credit-line, turns over $10, and becomes the
owner of the company. But now, wearing its hat once again as the senior
secured creditor, it is entitled to receive the $10 back again, as it is entitled to all the proceeds of the sale. Once it receives this money, it can
repay the loan. The transaction with the bank is a wash. If a competing
bidder tops its bid, the senior creditor will not have to draw on the credit line at all, and it will be paid everything it is owed. The senior creditor’s ability to borrow for a day and join the bidding ensures that it will
receive everything it is owed or, when the firm is worth less than this
amount, the entire firm.
Secured creditors do face significant transaction costs in orchestrating a cash bid. To minimize these, the Bankruptcy Code allows the secured creditor to forgo putting up cash. It can simply bid the amount of
its claim (and avoid the transaction costs and potential liquidity constraints associated with obtaining a day loan). The ability to credit bid,
however, may fall short of giving secured creditors who lack control
over their debtor complete protection. First, secured creditors need to be
able to act collectively. When the most senior tranche is not a single
creditor, but a diverse set of creditors who are constantly trading in and
out of the case, it may be hard for them to act as one. Even though they
occupy the same place in the capital structure, a hedge fund, a bank, or
a special purpose vehicle securitizing the claim can have radically different objectives.
In addition, credit bidding protects the senior creditor only if it has
the ability to take over the assets in the event that it proves to be the
high bidder. Not only must a mechanism allow someone competent to
run the operation, but doing this even for a short period of time (to allow, for example, a piecemeal sale) may require cash. Not all the members of the lending group may be willing to do this.
Whatever difficulties secured creditors face in bidding, however,
the Bankruptcy Code should minimize them. Developments after Chrysler have put the matter in doubt. While credit bidding is a right explicitly granted to secured creditors under §363, sales can also be conducted
under §1129, where the right to credit bid is less clear. The most recent
case—decided by the Third Circuit—involved the Philadelphia Inquirer.
The secured creditor was owed hundreds of millions. No one thought
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the company worth nearly that much and everyone agreed that there
should be a sale and that the secured creditors should get every penny.
The managers found a stalking-horse bidder who has agreed to
keep them on. This buyer offered the senior creditors $30 million in
cash. The senior lenders thought they would do better taking over the
business themselves and throwing out the existing management. The
senior lender was a consortium of several dozen financial institutions
and hedge funds. It was hard for them to assemble the resources to
make a competing bid, even though they would receive it all back. Taking advantage of this, the debtor proposed a plan of reorganization in
which a sale is part of the plan of reorganization, not under §363, and
argued that it did not have to give them an opportunity to credit-bid.
The Third Circuit agreed.21 The Fifth Circuit has found it similarly
unavailable.22 Section 1129 is written in the alternative and allows the
debtor to propose a plan in which the secured creditor is given, in lieu
of its right to credit bid, the “indubitable equivalent.” As credit-bidding
allows the secured creditor to gain control over the asset (including the
right to sell it to whomever and however it pleased), it is mystifying
how any plan that forced the secured creditor to take a particular bid
from a particular buyer provided the “indubitable equivalent.” A sale
for a fixed price to a buyer in league with existing managers hardly
seems the same as outright ownership.
The contrary argument that carried that day rested merely on the
language of the statute. Given that it was written in the alternative, some
plan must provide the indubitable equivalent of credit bidding. One
could not categorically deny the debtor to present such a plan. The debtor was entitled to show its plan passes this threshold and a conclusive
presumption against the plan was therefore inappropriate. As a matter
of narrow and literal statutory interpretation, the argument had some

See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 300 (3d Cir. 2010). One
should emphasize here, however, that denying secured creditors the ability to credit bid
merely imposes additional transaction costs, costs that the secured creditors may ultimately overcome. This proved ultimately the case in Philadelphia Newspapers. A group of
the secured lenders pooled their resources and went to the auction and prevailed in the
end. See Steven Church, Philadelphia Inquirer Lenders Best Perelman in Bankruptcy Court
Auction,
Bloomberg
News,
Sept.
23,
2010,
available
at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-23/philadelphia-inquirer-lenders-outbidraymond-perelman-for-newspaper-owner.html.
22 See In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 296 (5th Cir. 2009).
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force, but it otherwise has little to recommend it, especially as there was
little chance for the creditors to object to the plan a second time.23
In addition to ensuring that creditors that find themselves in the
position of the creditors in Chrysler, we must also worry about those
cases in which the senior creditors are the ones with control. The ability
to credit bid combined with control poses a threat to the rights of junior
investors, at least in those cases in which it is not self-evident that they
are out of the money. How to protect junior investors in these circumstances is an issue that has long been of concern to the law of corporate
reorganizations and this was the problem that arose in General Motors. I
turn to it next.
II. Innovation, Market Structure, and Economic Distress
The modern automobile goes back to the Model T. The image some
have of the Model T is Jedd Clampet and The Beverly Hillbillies—a rickety contraption held together by bailing wire and chewing gum. That is
fundamentally wrong.24 The Model T was a tough, durable car. After a
hundred years, quite a few are still running. More importantly, it was a
great technological break-through that introduced a design that became
the template for automobiles that lasted until the 1970s.25 The Model T’s
genius lay in its simplicity. Instead of a carriage on wheels with a motor
attached, the car consisted of three elements: the frame, an encased
drive train, and the body. The ability to change the body design and interior finishings allowed for the production of cars that looked quite different, but were fundamentally the same.26
In the decades after Henry Ford, the icon of automotive innovation
was Harley Earl, who reigned at General Motors from the 1930s through
the 1950s. General Motors featured him in its advertising even within
the last decade. Earl was born in Hollywood and started his career designing custom bodies for Tom Mix and Fatty Arbuckle. He brought
style, not technical know-how. Differentiation among his cars came
Judge Ambro makes this point ably in his Philadelphia Newspapers dissent. See In
re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting) (citing Vincent S.J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of
Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99 (2010)). This issue is now before the Seventh Circuit. See River Road Hotel Partners LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, Docket No. 103597 (7th Cir. 2010).
24 Among other things, Jedd did not drive a Model T, but rather a 1922 Oldsmobile.
25 See ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE 94 (1986).
26 Lee Iacocca’s sporty 1964 Mustang was a triumph of styling. Its Taunus V4 engine was from Ford Germany, while the Ford Falcon and Ford Fairlane were the source
of the chassis, suspension, and drivetrain components.
23
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from adornments, not technological innovation. The guts of the cars remained essentially the same and their engineering straightforward. A
mechanically inclined high school student could pretty much repair any
car on his own.27
All of this started to change in the 1970s. Instead of a separate frame
and body, unibody construction became the norm. The parts of each became much more integrated. In the 1980s, electronics took over cars. In
the 1990s, new materials increasingly replaced sheet metal. Machines
that had been not significantly more complicated than the Model T became sophisticated creatures of high technology. We can romanticize
the cars of the past, but cars today are better across all dimensions.
These changes were bad news to General Motors. The demand for
new cars came from the need to replace old cars.28 Because new cars
were better built and more reliable, they lasted longer and needed to be
replaced less often. Technological change brought another shift that disadvantaged manufacturers, such as General Motors, committed to an
existing infrastructure: The optimal size of the automobile company became smaller. Improved technology often leads to more vertical integration. We saw this in the automotive industry with the introduction of
the Model T. Ford transformed itself from a firm that bought virtually
all its components from the outside into its giant River Rouge works, in
which iron ore entered at one end and cars emerged at the other.29 Alfred Sloan worked a similar change at General Motors.30 But technological change can push in the opposite direction too, and this has been the
recent history of the automobile industry.31 We are in an era of massive
vertical deintegration. General Motors is soon to have only 31,000 hourly workers, almost an order of magnitude smaller than what it used to
have. Chrysler’s workforce has shrunk by a comparable amount.
To be sure, some of the reduction comes from declining production
and some from increased automation, but that is only part of the explanation. The workforce has become smaller largely because the amount
27 Indeed, Grant Achatz reassembled a 1970 GTO from its component pieces as a
sixteen-year-old before putting his talents to other use. See GRANT ACHATZ & NICK KOKONAS, LIFE, ON THE LINE: A CHEF'S STORY OF CHASING GREATNESS, FACING DEATH, AND
REDEFINING THE WAY WE EAT 11-14 (2011).
28 With more cars in this country than licensed drivers, the domestic market is
close to being saturated.
29 For its first model, the Ford Motor Company spent $384 on components and $20
on assembling them. See LACEY, supra note 25, at 70.
30 See ALFRED P. SLOAN, JR., MY YEARS WITH GENERAL MOTORS (Doubleday 1963).
31 See JAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T. JONES & DANIEL ROOS, THE MACHINE THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD (Free Press 2007).
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of outsourcing has increased. Instead of having one supplier make the
speedometer and another a fuel gauge that the auto manufacturer incorporates within the dashboard, today one supplier sells the car manufacturer the entire assembled dashboard. The manufacturer merely attaches it to the car. Instead of sewing the seat covers, today’s manufacturer has someone else build the entire seat assembly. These much more
substantial components are brought together in an assembly plant that,
if optimally designed, is much smaller than its predecessors and employs fewer people.
Moreover, as cars have become more complicated, relevant design
and manufacturing expertise is less likely to be found in-house. Supporting a large team of engineers in-house make sense when changes
are largely ornamental. All Harley Earl’s design team needed was modeling clay. In such a world, a shift from one model to another might require a large investment in new dies to stamp out different pieces of
sheet metal, but the same team could design these pieces of metal year
in and year out. Today, designing a car requires drawing on many different kinds of expertise in smaller or larger measure. A car manufacturer is less likely to have the expertise needed on its payroll. At the
same time, computer-assisted design has made it easier to work for engineers to work with each other at a distance in different firms.
A car company invests in a number of car projects and enjoys its
profits from those that prove successful in the marketplace. Gone are the
days in which consumers are loyal throughout their lives to a particular
carmaker and demand for each can be confidently predicted from one
year to the next. Crucial to the success of a car company today is having
a number of models in production that are successful in the marketplace
and having a number of others in the pipeline. If a car company does
not have this, it has few advantages relative to a new entrant, and none
relative to an established firm with successful models.32 Moreover, in
this environment, it is important to have the ability to ramp up production when a model proves successful and ramp it down when it does
not.
America’s comparative advantages change over time and, at some
point, it ceases to have any comparative advantage in making a particular type of product. This has happened in the case of televisions, but it
has not yet happened with cars. Cars, at least the larger ones, can still be
32 A caveat to this is the need to have some distribution system in place. This is in
large part the result of legal rules that limit the ways in which cars can be distributed.
Saturn, for example, had value only because of the possibility that a new automobile
manufacturer would want its distribution network.

Car Trouble / 17

profitably designed and manufactured in this country. Some of Toyota’s
successful products, such as the Tundra, are designed in this country by
engineers who began their careers at General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. The question was not whether there will be American car companies, but rather whether, given these changes, they will include General
Motors.
At the time of the sudden collapse in demand for automobiles,
General Motors was making its best cars ever. Some models, such as the
Malibu, were competitive, and there were new cars in its pipeline. Some
were promising even though others, such as the Volt, would never bring
any profits. But General Motors had to solve a number of problems if it
was to compete successfully against other American car companies.
General Motors had collective bargaining agreements that were
hopelessly out of step with existing conditions. Standing alone, they
were not an insurmountable problem. The contracts themselves were of
relatively recent vintage, and experience in the steel industry showed
that unions were willing to make drastic changes in their contracts if the
survival of the business turned on it.
The collective bargaining agreements were symptomatic, however,
of a much larger problem—deeply embedded norms that were out of
step with what it took for a modern automobile company to be successful. That problem would not go away with a different collective bargaining agreement. It was part of a culture in which the way everything was
done assumed a method of production that had long passed. General
Motors was saddled with an infrastructure that was too large. Everything from its factories to its executive offices was excessive given the
optimal amount of outsourcing.
Compounding this problem, General Motors’s infrastructure was
premised on the idea that it made sense for one company to produce a
complete line of cars. (“A car for every purpose and every purse,” as
Alfred Sloan used to say.) This was easy when cars shared a common
platform and many common components. But as cars become increasingly sophisticated, one can no longer make many models with just a
few platforms. Firms possessed different competences that change over
time. No one firm can be confident that, over time, it will remain adept
at building competitive cars at every price point.
General Motors was now best at building large, technically sophisticated cars. Smaller and less complicated cars put a premium on cheap,
relatively unskilled labor. Freed of constraints, General Motors might
not even make small cars domestically. Unfortunately, this segment of
the market is now the one in which there is the greatest demand. Legal
regulation compounds the problem. The CAFE standards put in place in
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the 1970s had a nice virtue. Instead of micromanaging car companies,
regulators told them the average fuel economy they were to have across
their entire fleets. In a world in which the Big Three made all the cars
and each made cars of all types, they bore the burden of making the
trade-offs. In a world in which there are more players, each making different kinds of cars, this burden falls disproportionately hard on those
like General Motors whose comparative advantage is making bigger
cars.
In short, at the start of 2009, General Motors was in terrible shape,
even without its legacy costs and collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the disconnect between General Motors’s CEO Rick Waggoner
and the world around him was completely understandable. Like many
managers, he measured the state of General Motors relative to its condition at the time he took the helm. By any measure, the General Motors
of 2009 was better than the General Motors of 2000. Waggoner could not
believe he could change as much as he had and still have a company
that was hopelessly uncompetitive.
General Motors’s ability to survive over the long term remains unclear. It requires a wholesale change of well-entrenched norms and a
dramatic rescaling of its infrastructure. Even with these substantial
modifications, its survival depends on a relatively quick return to historic levels of domestic demand for automobiles as well as the ability to
shrink every aspect of its operations dramatically.
General Motors’s bankruptcy, like Chrysler’s, took the form of an
asset sale. The debtor at the time of filing the petition proposed a sale to
an identified buyer. The dynamics of the case, however, were altogether
different. While Chrysler had no ability to survive as a going concern,
regardless of how much money was spent to keep it intact, General Motors had a chance to survive—at a cost that likely exceeded the value of
its assets—if it were dramatically transformed. The ability to sell assets
in bankruptcy allowed the kind of transformation that was a necessary,
though far from sufficient condition for its survival as a going concern.
III. Asset Sales and Senior Creditor Control
At the time General Motors received its first infusion of financial
aid in the waning days of the Bush administration, it had relatively little
secured debt. As a result, the government’s loans, like most loans to financially troubled businesses, were secured. These loans, combined
with billions more in debtor-in-possession financing were large relative
to the value of General Motors’s assets. Indeed in all likelihood, they
were greater than the value of these assets. Because the government was
both the largest creditor and enjoyed, in essence, a first-priority posi-
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tion,33 it controlled the bankruptcy process. While Chrysler presented
the challenge of ensuring the sales process respected the right of senior
creditors who did not have control, here the juniors were the ones who
lacked control and needed protecting.
The Task Force acted with respect to General Motors the same way
as would any other secured creditor. Long past is the day in which the
old managers of a financially distressed business called the shots. Well
in advance of the bankruptcy petition, secured creditors begin to control
the governance of the business.34 By the time of the bankruptcy petition,
the senior secured lenders will already have their hands on the levers.
They often replace the CEO. Technically speaking, of course, the secured creditor has no power to replace the CEO, only the board. But as a
practical matter, the secured creditor often calls the shots. If it is the only
source of debtor-in-possession financing and insists on the head of the
CEO as a condition of providing it, members of the board are essentially
choosing between keeping the company alive on the one hand or showing loyalty to someone who invited them to a few golf tournaments on
the other. It is not a hard call.
In addition to changing the management team, the secured creditors review the various exit options with the board. Among them include having the debtor put up the assets for a quick sale in bankruptcy,
either to the secured creditor or to some buyer.35 The speedy sale that
gives little time for rival bids worked to the disadvantage of the dissident secured creditors in Chrysler, but in the mine run of cases, it is the
device that secured creditors use to the detriment of those junior to
them. Because they do not gain from postponing a sale and face all the
downside if things go worse than expected, the secured creditors have
an incentive to force through a speedy sale.
If the firm is worth less what the secured creditor is owed, there is
no problem with a sale being conducted under its aegis. We need to
worry, however, that the secured creditor is pushing through a speedy
and low-valuation sale even when the assets are worth more than what

33 More precisely, the debt that was senior was so small relative to the value of the
assets that the creditors who held it were confident of being paid in full and played only
a minor role in the reorganization.
34 There is a growing body of empirical work on this issue. For a representative example, see Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance,
and
Firm
Value
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344302.
35 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2006).
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it is owed.36 The secured creditor and the managers possess private information not available to anyone else. By binding together, they can
suppress information about the value of the business.
When the secured creditors want either to sell the firm or acquire it
outright with a credit bid, the bankruptcy judge can be put in an impossible position. The business can maintain its ongoing operations only
if it can continue to use its existing cash reserves to meet the payroll and
acquire new supplies. The reserves, however, are subject to the senior
creditor’s security interest. The Bankruptcy Code severely limits the
ability of the bankruptcy judge to authorize their use.37 As a practical
matter, consent from the secured creditor is required in the absence of
someone else willing to make a loan subject to the security interest. The
secured creditor appears and asserts that it is willing to consent only if
the judge approves the sale on an expedited basis.
Approving the sale offers the bankruptcy judge the path of least resistance. The motion is made on the first day of the case, and the junior
creditors will have had little time to organize any opposition. Bankruptcy judges are disinclined to risk shutting the firm down by turning
down a motion to which no one has objected. As between having a case
disappear from her docket or having it explode into thousands of contentious lawsuits over the wreckage that follows in the wake of a piecemeal liquidation, judges are inclined to favor the former. Judges fear
that if they push back too hard, the secured creditor will indeed refuse
to finance the business and it will shut down.
Brinkmanship of this sort has become commonplace in bankruptcy
court. Conventional game theory models suggest that this bargaining
game has multiple equilibria, including one in which the firm liquidates.
Assume that Firm is worth $120 if it remains intact and $30 if liquidated.
Bank is the senior creditor and is owed $100. Bank has a choice between
two strategies. In one, it proposes a speedy sale (one in which it makes a
credit bid of $100 and a cash bid of $10) and simultaneously commits
itself to rejecting any subsequent bargaining. In the other, it can ask for a
speedy sale on the same terms, but prepare to engage in bargaining in
the event that the judge pushes back. Such preparation costs it $10. The
bankruptcy judge similarly has a choice between a soft and a tough negotiating strategy.
There is some empirical evidence that this is in fact happening. See Kenneth
Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, Columbia Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 321, Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
08–16) (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081661.
37 See 11 U.S.C. §364.
36
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If the judge adopts the soft strategy, and Bank is committed, the
sale goes forward as Bank proposes. In return for its $100 claim and its
cash contribution of $10, Bank gets a business worth $120. General creditors receive only $10, even though they are entitled to the difference
between what the business is worth and what the secured creditor is
owed.
If Bank is willing to bargain and the judge again takes a soft position, the payoffs are the same, but Bank has spent $10 preparing to bargain. If the judge adopts a tough position, and Bank is willing to bargain, Bank nets $90 ($100, less expenses of $10), while the general creditors receive $20. If Bank and the judge both adopt tough strategies, the
firm is liquidated. Bank receives $20 (net of expenses) and the general
creditors receive nothing.
If we assume the judge acts to maximize the recovery of the general
creditors, the game has three Nash equilibria—one in which Bank
adopts the tough strategy and the judge adopts the soft strategy; another in which Bank is soft and the judge tough; and the last in which the
judge adopts the soft strategy with ⅞ probability and Bank adopts the
soft strategy with ½ probability.38
These different equilibria capture the problems we face. First is the
pure-strategy equilibrium in which the judge acquiesces and Bank
adopts a tough strategy. The problem with this equilibrium, however, is
that Bank receives more than the $100 it is owed and the rights of the
junior creditors are compromised. The second pure-strategy equilibrium
is problematic over two dimensions. First, Bank has been forced to bargain and $10 has been lost as a consequence. Second, this rule compromises Bank’s entitlements, as it is effectively recovering only $90 (net of
costs), when it is owed $100. The mixed-strategy equilibrium is the
worst of all worlds, as $100 of value is lost.
We need to ask how to change the structure of this game. We want
procedures that protect the rights of junior investors. At the same time,
the procedures should minimize the costs of the process and try to ensure that the senior creditors are paid in full. It might seem that we have
seen all this before.39 In the 1890s, most of the railroads in the country
were insolvent. They had more debt than they could ever hope to repay.
The existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium is a common feature of games that
have this structure, such as matching pennies, chicken, and hawk-dove.
39 Ralph Brubaker and Charles Tabb, among others, have pointed this out. See
Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy reorganizations and the troubling legacy
of Chrysler and GM. U. Ill. L. Rev. 1375, 1400-01 (2010); Ralph Brubaker, The Chrysler and
GM Sales: §363 Plans of Reorganization?, 28 BANKR. LETTER, No. 9, at 12 (2009).
38
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There was a huge amount of secured debt and the secured creditors
again controlled the reorganization process. Judges recognized the need
to police them.
Critics of speedy sales today will likely point to the subsequent evolution of the law. The protections judges devised led to the reforms of
the 1930s, the introduction of the absolute priority rule into bankruptcy,
and eventually the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. In other words, the existing protections that junior investors enjoy in Chapter 11 evolved out of
an effort to ensure that, when the business was sold, especially when it
was sold to senior secured creditors, that their rights were protected. In
other words, secured creditors today who push for speedy sales are
short-circuiting a reorganization process put in place precisely because
of the abuses that speedy sales generated.
Under this view, the incremental protections being discovered today for sales under §363 will ultimately lead us back to the protections
already embedded in the plan confirmation process in Chapter 11. Rather than wait for these procedures to evolve, we should go to its end
point at once. We should limit the availability of sales altogether. We
should insist that dispositions of the firm as a going concern go through
the plan process. Only the narrowest exceptions should exist for the few
cases in which the businesses are in fact “melting ice cubes.” The protections built into Chapter 11 are the ones history teaches us are needed to
prevent abusive sales. End runs around them are inappropriate. At the
very least, the protections junior creditors enjoyed when assets were
sold during an equity receivership should remain.
This line of reasoning should be rejected. Today the filing of a bankruptcy petition is a recognition event that collapses future possibilities
to present value. This was not the case with the equity receivership.
Modern bankruptcy law embraces a regime of absolute priority. By contrast, before 1939, reorganization law adopted a rule of relative priority.
In a relative priority regime, the restructuring is not one that collapses
future possibilities. The option value of junior interests is recognized
even when they are underwater. The procedural rules needed in the two
cases are fundamentally different.
In an absolute priority regime, the senior creditor has an incentive
to push for an immediate sale, while the junior investor wants delay.
Consider another example. Bank has a senior claim for $100. If there is
an immediate sale for more than $100, Bank receives $100 with certainty. But let us assume that, there is no sale and the business remains in
their hands, there is a fifty-fifty chance the firm will be worth $160 and
an equal chance the firm will be worth only $80. If the firm turns out to
be worth $160, Bank will still only receive $100, and if it turns out to be
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worth $80, Bank will receive only that much. Thus, while Bank gets $100
if everything is settled today, it realizes in expectation only $90 if there
is delay. Junior investors have exactly the opposite incentive. Bank and
the junior investors know a little more than anyone else about the value
of the firm in good and bad states of the world. Given their private information, there is no guarantee that a buyer will appear willing to pay
as much. Nevertheless, Bank will push for a sale as long as the offer is
for more than $100. In contrast, the junior creditors will resist a sale even
when there is an offer for more than $120.
The costs associated with an early disposition—the risk of a fire
sale40—are borne by the junior investors, while the secured creditors
bear the risk of asset depreciation that comes with the delay. It may not
be possible to have procedures that both ensure a sale for top dollar and
at the same time adequately protect the secured creditor’s priority position. In theory, of course, the junior investors in our example should be
able to offer adequate protection to the secured creditor, as they hold
the fulcrum security. (The firm if reorganized rather than sold, it is
worth $120 and the secured creditors are owed only $100.) But if the junior creditors face any problems in organizing, it may not be possible.
We usually need to make a trade-off between rules that prevent fire
sales on the one hand and rules that force junior investors to bear the
costs of delay on the other.
This tension between junior and senior stakeholders is simply not
the problem that judges faced in trying to police the players in an equity
receivership. The equity receivership was a regime of relative priority,
rather than absolute priority, and in a relative priority regime the tension between junior and senior creditors largely disappears. One can see
how relative priority worked with a variation on the previous example.
Bank is once again owed $100. The firm can be sold today. If firm is not
sold, there are two possibilities, each appears equally likely. Under one
outcome, the firm, as best as anyone on the outside can tell, will be
worth $160. Under the other, the firm will be worth only $80.
40 Of course, at first blush, a fire sale does not lead to an efficiency loss. The investors as a group receive less, but the assets themselves may still be put to their best use.
An investor with a diversified portfolio is indifferent to sale prices when she is equally
likely to be a buyer or a seller. As has been observed often before, there are still potential
costs. First, the fire sale may not simply yield a lower price. It may also put the asset in
the hands of someone who values it less. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992).
Second, entrepreneurs may be able to raise less capital in the first instance as investors
are undercompensated in bad states of the world. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory
of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2005).
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In a relative priority regime, the shares of both Bank and the junior
investors are fixed at the outset according to their expected value at the
time of the bankruptcy petition. In this example, junior investors would
receive one-sixth of whatever was realized and Bank would receive the
balance.41 With their shares fixed, Bank and the junior investors decide
jointly on whether to sell Firm or reorganize. Because their claims have
been transformed into shares in Firm, the tension that would otherwise
exist between junior and senior investor disappears. Both now care only
about maximizing the value of the business because their relative shares
are fixed.
A regime of relative priority is analogous to the admiralty rule of
the general average.42 If the ship is foundering, those with cargo aboard
the ship have their rights to their cargo transformed into a pro rata share
of all the cargo on the ship. In this regime, the decision about what cargo to throw overboard is separated from the question of who owns it. A
regime of relative priority treats a bankruptcy filing the same way. The
need for the different investors to work cooperatively justifies ensuring
that the reorganization is not a recognition event. By giving Bank a fixed
share of Firm, it will always favor whatever course will maximize the
overall value of the firm, as that course will also maximize its own
share.
Relative priority has the feature of sharing some of the value of the
firm with junior investors even when the assets are not worth enough to
pay them in full.43 Consider the case in which Firm will be worth either
$80 or $160 with equal probability, but Bank is owed $140. In a regime
of absolute priority, Bank is entitled to the entire firm, as it is owed
more than the firm is worth. Not so in a regime of relative priority. In
such a regime, Bank receives a share of the company that reflects the
probability that it will receive its $140 half the time and only $80 the rest
of the time. The expected value of its claim is therefore $110. The firm is

41 The best estimate of the value of the business is $120. As Bank is owed $100, $20
of the value is left for the junior investors. The difficulty of designing a mechanism that
gets the initial valuation set in a way that does not distort the incentives of the parties
had long been thought to a stumbling block to implementing a relative priority regime
in the absence of the strong norms that existed during the equity receivership.
42 Jackson and Scott were the first to invoke the analogy of the rule of the general
average in bankruptcy. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 164–
78 (1989).
43 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001)
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worth $120, and Bank receives 11/12ths of the business and the junior
investors receive 1/12ths.
A relative priority regime is one in which the restructuring preserves the option value of the junior interest, even when that interest
would be wiped out if there were a sale or some other event that collapsed all future possibilities to present value. The valuation does not
have the same knife-edge character as it does in an absolute priority regime in which a small change in interest rates can affect whether a class
is in money or wiped altogether. In a relative priority regime, the bankruptcy restructuring leaves unaffected the value of each investor’s claim
against the firm. All of the players want to chart a course that is wealth
maximizing. The players had no reason to hide information from each
other. Junior and senior creditors do not have conflicting interests. They
can even hire the same lawyer to represent them.44
Since the 1930s, relative priority regimes have enjoyed a poor reputation among bankruptcy academics. Partisans of absolute priority from
William O. Douglas to Alan Schwartz have insisted that only absolute
priority regimes vindicate the creditors’ bargain and maximize the capital that entrepreneurs can raise in the first instance. “Deviations” from
absolute priority are tolerated only to the extent needed to overcome the
bad incentives that exist in the reorganization process.
Relative priority regimes suffered both because its advocates were
practicing lawyers (principally Paul Cravath and Robert Swaine) who
were thought to be biased. Moreover, relative priority regimes were implemented through norms that were not transparent and on that ground
suspect as well. In the absence of a well-developed understanding of
options, it was hard to explain exactly what a relative priority regime
was and, until recently, the conventional wisdom had been that such a
regime could not be implemented.45
Relative priority regimes today have few defenders.46 Nevertheless,
we may be selling them short. Relative priority emerged in a largely
44 In the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe reorganization, for example, the same lawyer
represented both the first- and second-lienholders simultaneously, and no one seemed
to have thought it problematic. I asked one of this lawyer’s partners about the apparent
conflict of interest, but he refused to discuss the matter, invoking the attorney-client
privilege. As recently as 2009, the firm represented the railroad.
45 As is too often the case, the conventional wisdom was wrong. See Anthony J. Casey, The Benefit of the Creditors’ Bargain: Option-Preservation Priority In Chapter 11, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. ●●● (forthcoming 2010).
46 Indeed, among law and economics scholars who adhere to the standard Jackson
creditors’ bargain model, Tony Casey stands conspicuously alone. See Casey, supra note
45.
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contractual regime in which sophisticated parties were on both sides of
the transaction. It was abandoned largely as a result of meddling by a
bankruptcy professor at the Yale Law School who did not seem to have
understood relative priority and who was in any event utterly clueless
about the advantages such a priority regime brought with it.
This is a familiar story that has been told elsewhere.47 What matters
for our purposes is that the procedural protections that judges cared
about at the end of the nineteenth century have nothing to do with the
rules now needed to police sales in bankruptcy as the priority regimes
are fundamentally different. Indeed, some of the rules developed during that period—in particular looking with suspicion on any plan that
leaves some people out in the cold—have lost their purpose.
As it first developed, only the key players enjoyed the benefits of
relative priority. Creditors whose collateral consisted of a spur line that
the railroad no longer needed might be left out in the cold. The rules for
including and excluding the players were norm-based and not transparent to the outside. Ultimately, the Supreme Court insisted that every
claimant participate and enjoy the option value of their underwater
claims.48 Skipping over any claimant was not permissible.
But in an absolute priority regime, out-of-the-money claims are not
entitled to anything. Option value is not recognized. Hence, there is
nothing substantively the matter with it in an absolute priority regime.
The holder of the fulcrum security has the right to ignore everyone,
while in a relative priority regime it must take everyone into account. In
an absolute priority regime, a gift to a junior class becomes problematic
only if it is used to corrupt the reorganization process.
The challenge under absolute priority then is distinguishing between situations in which the payoff to some, but not all of the junior
interest holders is done because the senior claimant finds it in her interest as the owner of the firm and those situations in which the payoff is
the device that the senior claimant uses to become the owner of the

47 See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(2001); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13.
48 The Supreme Court held that their interests had to be taken into account, but did
not explain how their shares were to be calculated. See Northern Pacific Railway v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (noting with elaboration that a creditor’s “interest can be
preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he
declines a fair offer he is left to protect himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard
in a court of equity to attack it.”)
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firm.49 The rules designed for a relative priority regime may do a bad
job of this. In all events, Chapter 11 stands at a crossroads. We have two
different paths—reorganization and a sale—and two different mechanisms to police abuse from the senior secured creditor who exercises control.
In a reorganization, the junior claimants are protected through a
valuation mechanism and an anti-gifting rule. It would simply not have
been possible to reorganize Chrysler or General Motors and protect the
retiree pension programs as part of a plan of reorganization.50 By contrast, there are no rules that prevent them if there is a sale, beyond the
general ability of the bankruptcy judge to oversee the sale and deny approval if she believes that abuse is present. The contrast between the
two regimes reflects the relative infirmities of rules and standards respectively. More to the point, the choice between sale or reorganization
should turn on the route that maximizes the value of the estate. The party in control should not be choosing one route rather than another merely because one permits gifting and the other does not.
The anti-gifting rule in a traditional reorganization is emblematic of
a much larger problem. The judge must value the assets in an adversary
process where some of the players have private information and others
do not.51 The anti-gifting rule, originally designed to ensure a distributional outcome in a relative priority regime, is only weakly correlated
with ensuring that the valuation is done correctly. There are any number of other reforms to reorganizations that do more to solve the problem. These range from mimicking approaches to valuation that parties
take in private contracts.52 Alternatively, as Richard Hynes as pointed
out, a reorganization regime can require a judge to set an expiration
date on the junior creditor’s option instead of requiring her to value the
assets. Such a restructuring regime avoids the liquidity problems of an
actual sale or Bebchuk options, and, unlike standard reorganization re-

49

Brubaker and Tabb make this point. See Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 39, at 1396-

97.
See In re DBSD North America, Inc., —F.3d —, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. 2011).
For an analysis of decisionmaking in such contexts, see Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18 (1986).
52 See, e.g., Keith Scharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 364-65 (2003) (describing contractual valuation
mechanisms using expert appraisers in the Merck/Schering-Plough and Verizon/Vodafone joint ventures).
50
51
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gimes, it puts more modest demands on the bankruptcy judge than a
full-scale valuation.53
It is unlikely, however, that reorganization regimes will supplant
swift going-concern sales of the sort witnessed in Chrysler and General
Motors. If the firm is losing money on an operating basis and the secured
creditor (whether J.P. Morgan or the United States government) is the
only one willing to finance the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge must
act quickly in an environment in which her ability to protect junior parties is limited. She may be forced to choose between either liquidating
the business or agreeing to whatever sale procedures that the secured
creditor demands. An anti-gifting rule or other rules structuring the sale
process may obscure the underlying problem.
Return to the bargaining game set out above. This game is embedded inside a larger game. The procedures available to sell the assets and
the options available to the bankruptcy judge turn in large part on the
actions of the secured creditor before the bankruptcy began. We can
have two cases in which Bank comes in and proposes to sell the assets
for $100 to the same buyer and sets out identical procedures for what
someone else must do to make a topping bid, and the two cases can be
radically different. We need to know what happened before the bankruptcy began.
If the firm has been shopped and if all the options (including liquidation options) have been completely explored, extensive procedures in
bankruptcy are not necessary and whatever cursory procedures that secured creditor poses are likely unobjectionable. On the other hand, if the
secured creditor has done too little before bankruptcy, allowing it to jam
through a sale is inherently problematic, especially if it is credit-bidding.
Bankruptcy rules need to provide the proper incentives in the period leading up to bankruptcy. One might consider tying the hands of
bankruptcy judges. Imagine, for example, that the legal rule that allowed the bankruptcy judge to authorize a speedy sale only if, but only
if the firm has been adequately shopped prepetition. If the firm has not
been adequately shopped, an extended sales process is mandatory. If
additional resources are needed to keep the firm running, the secured
creditor can provide them. If the secured creditor is unwilling, the firm
will be liquidated.
A liquidation might yield substantially less than the offer on the table at the time of the filing of the petition. Everyone loses, of course, if
53 See Richard M. Hynes, Redeeming Reorganization (Jan. 11, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Virginia).
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things come to this. But if the bankruptcy judge’s hands are tied and the
secured creditor knows in advance that they will be tied, then it will ensure that the firm was adequately shopped before bankruptcy. Because
the secured creditor no longer has the ability to play a game of chicken
with the bankruptcy judge, it will lay the ground work before the petition is filed. Or so the theory goes. One may doubt whether such handstying rules work. Most efforts to adopt a strict policy of never-negotiatewith-terrorists break down.
IV. Conclusion
Chrysler and General Motors expose foundational issues in the law of
corporate reorganizations. One can fault the bankruptcy judges in these
cases for not insisting on more procedures and in particular for not insisting that liquidating bids be affirmatively welcomed, but it would not
likely have affected the outcome in Chrysler and would have been entirely symbolic in the case of General Motors. As long as we remain
committed to the absolute priority rule, the central question is one of
designing a mechanism that induces everyone, before the filing and afterwards, to take steps that ensure that the firm is sold for top dollar. In
the end, the choice is not whether we regulate sales more, but how we
do it. This may turn in part on such questions as how much the hands of
a bankruptcy judge can be tied without interfering with her ability to
manage the case.54

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Douglas G. Baird
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
douglas_baird@law.uchicago.edu

54 A hands-tying strategy could be implemented either through rulemaking or legislative action.
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